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Abstract 
 
Governments issue “stay at home” orders to reduce the spread of contagious diseases, but the 
magnitude of such orders’ effectiveness is uncertain. In the United States these orders were not 
coordinated at the national level during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, 
which creates an opportunity to use spatial and temporal variation to measure the policies’ effect 
with greater accuracy. Here, we combine data on the timing of stay-at-home orders with daily 
confirmed COVID-19 cases and fatalities at the county level in the United States. We estimate 
the effect of stay-at-home orders using a difference-in- differences design that accounts for 
unmeasured local variation in factors like health systems and demographics and for unmeasured 
temporal variation in factors like national mitigation actions and access to tests. Compared to 
counties that did not implement stay-at-home orders, the results show that the orders are 
associated with a 30.2 percent (11.0 to 45.2) reduction in weekly cases after one week, a 40.0 
percent (23.4 to 53.0) reduction after two weeks, and a 48.6 percent (31.1 to 61.7) reduction after 
three weeks. Stay-at-home orders are also associated with a 59.8 percent (18.3 to 80.2) reduction 
in weekly fatalities after three weeks. These results suggest that stay-at-home orders reduced 
confirmed cases by 390,000 (170,000 to 680,000) and fatalities by 41,000 (27,000 to 59,000) 
within the first three weeks in localities where they were implemented. 
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Introduction 
 
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) first appeared as a cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan, 
China on December 31, 2019​1​ and was declared a global pandemic by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020.​2​ As of May 6, 2020, the European Centers for Disease 
Control reports that worldwide there have been 3,623,803 confirmed cases of COVID-19, 
resulting in 256,880 deaths.​3 
 
The United States has both the highest number of cases (1,204,475) and deaths (71,078) due to 
the disease.​3​ As a result, the U.S. government has been widely criticized for inaction in the early 
stages of the pandemic.​2​ Although the first confirmed case of COVID-19 was reported to the 
Centers for Disease Control on January 21, 2020 and documented transmission commenced 
immediately,​4​ a national state of emergency was not declared until nearly two months later on 
March 13. At that time, the only mandatory action at the national level was international travel 
restrictions.​5 
 
While the national government has the authority to act, the United States is a federal political 
system where public health is normally the purview of the fifty states. Furthermore, each state 
often delegates health authority to cities and/or counties, geographic political units nested within 
states. As a result, responses to COVID-19 varied across states and counties and led to spatial 
and temporal variation in implementation of mitigation procedures. This variation in policy 
responses has likely contributed to significant variation in the incidence of cases and fatalities -- 
as well as the downstream social and economic effects of the disease -- across jurisdictions in the 
United States.​6–11 
 
A variety of government policies have been proposed and used to mitigate the spread and 
consequence of pandemic diseases like COVID-19, ranging from investments in medical testing, 
contact tracing, and clinical management, to school closures, banning of mass gatherings, 
quarantines, and population stay-at-home orders.​12​ China’s extensive interventions appear to 
have been successful at limiting the outbreak.​13,14​  These include quarantines both for those 
diagnosed and those undiagnosed but who had been in Hubei province during the outbreak,​15​ and 
restrictions on travel to and from affected areas.​16​ In contrast, school closures across East Asia 
were estimated to be much less effective.​17 
 
With estimates that nearly half of transmissions occur from pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic 
individuals, epidemiological simulations suggest that quarantines of symptomatic individuals 
alone will be insufficient to halt the pandemic.​18​ This has led to widespread adoption of 
population-wide policies to dramatically reduce social contact.  
 
2 
Here, we study the role of stay-at-home orders, perhaps the most common policy intervention in 
the United States and Europe. Stay-at-home orders require citizens to shelter in their residence 
with very few exceptions and have typically been implemented along with school closures, bans 
on mass gatherings, and closure of non-essential businesses. These policies are associated with a 
significant reduction in observed mobility,​19​ and initial evidence from New York City and 
California suggests that they can be effective in reducing case growth in the United States.​8,20 
Yet, because each locality in the U.S. has many factors that contribute to differential rates of 
transmission, statistical efforts to control for potential confounds and to identify the precise 
effects of stay-at-home orders across the U.S. are critical to understanding whether -- and to what 
degree -- such policies are working. 
 
Results 
 
We collected data on stay-at-home orders, COVID-19 confirmed cases, rates of testing, and 
fatalities by day and county throughout the United States (see Methods).  Figure 1 shows that the 
number of cases and fatalities grew exponentially from March 1 to May 3, 2020. It also suggests 
that efforts to “flatten the curve” initiated in mid-to-late March helped to reduce the rate of 
exponential growth.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.​ ​(a)​  Log of cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases by county and date. ​(b)​ Log of cumulative 
confirmed COVID-19 fatalities by county and date. Lines are gradient-colored by date of first case and 
date of first fatality, respectively (blue = early to light blue = middle to orange = late). 
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Figure 2.​ ​(a)​ Distribution of stay-at-home orders at the county level by date in the United States.  ​(b) 
Mean county-level weekly growth in total confirmed COVID-19 cases in the United States by the number 
of days before or after a stay-at-home order. 
 
 
Figure 2a shows the distribution of stay-at-home order dates. By April 7, 2020, 18 states (1,451 
counties) had different counties with different order dates, 27 states and the District of Columbia 
had statewide orders with no local variation (1,307 counties) and 5 states (386 counties) had no 
order in place.  Figure 2b shows how the mean county-level weekly growth rate in COVID-19 
cases changed relative to the date the stay-at-home order went into effect in counties that 
implemented a stay-at-home order. Peak growth in these counties occurred three days before the 
order went into effect. 
 
The growth rate of cases began to decline following the orders. In Figure 3, we group counties 
by the date a stay-at-home order was implemented and show how confirmed cases and fatalities 
changed with respect to the order.  For example, the top blue curve in both panels refers to all 
counties with stay-at-home orders enacted on March 23 or 24, notably including the epicenter of 
the pandemic in New York.  We then plot the set of counties that did not issue any stay-at-home 
order during this time period with a thicker orange line to highlight how this group of counties 
differs from those with an order.  Although the curves have been “flattened” in all counties, the 
flattening in counties without an order is much less, particularly with respect to cases.  
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Figure 3. ​Weekly ​(a)​ newly-confirmed COVID-19 cases in the United States and ​(b)​ confirmed fatalities. 
Each line represents an aggregation of counties that issued stay-at-home orders during the same two-day 
period (blue) or did not issue an order (orange).  Observations are grouped to two-day pairs to facilitate 
visualization. 
 
 
Table 1 shows growth in log weekly cases both on the date an order goes into effect and 21 days 
after the order.  Each row presents corresponding weekly growth on the same dates for the set of 
all counties where no such order ever went into effect. For example, the first row shows that 
weekly cases for the six counties who issued an order on March 17 grew from March 10 to 
March 17 by 1.02 units on a log scale. For the 506 counties that would never issue such an order, 
weekly case growth from March 10 to March 17 averaged 1.39 units on a log scale. 
 
Although growth slowed for all counties over each 21 day period, with or without an order, the 
last column in Table 1 shows that it slowed faster for every single county group with an order 
than for the counties that did not issue an order.  Fatalities follow the same pattern, as shown in 
Table 2.  Once again, growth slows for all counties, but the rightmost column shows that 1,931 
of the 2,647 counties with orders are in groups that decline faster than counties without orders. 
 
Although these results suggest that stay-at-home orders worked, a number of factors might 
confound this association in the raw data. For example, stay-at-home orders might closely follow 
earlier targeted mitigation measures at the national level (such as travel restrictions issued by the 
State Department or recommendations by the CDC on mass gatherings). There might also exist  
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One Week Change in  
Log Weekly Cases       
  
Counties With 
Stay-at-Home 
Order 
Counties Without 
Stay-at-Home 
Order    
Date 
Stay-at-Home 
Order Went 
Into Effect 
Number 
of 
Counties 
On 
Day of 
Order 
21 Days 
After 
Order 
On 
Day of 
Order 
21 Days 
After 
Order 
21-Day 
Difference  
in Change,  
With  
Order 
21-Day 
Difference 
in Change, 
Without 
Order 
Difference in 
Difference, 
Counties With 
Orders and Without 
Orders 
3/17/20 6 1.02 0.71 1.39 1.10 -0.31 -0.29 -0.02 
3/19/20 52 2.00 1.00 1.34 0.89 -1.00 -0.45 -0.55 
3/21/20 104 2.52 0.88 1.52 0.66 -1.64 -0.85 -0.79 
3/22/20 23 2.87 0.99 1.59 0.66 -1.88 -0.92 -0.96 
3/23/20 209 2.63 0.41 1.50 0.54 -2.22 -0.96 -1.26 
3/24/20 258 2.20 0.57 1.61 0.50 -1.63 -1.10 -0.53 
3/25/20 308 1.93 0.47 1.65 0.46 -1.46 -1.19 -0.27 
3/26/20 77 1.67 0.22 1.42 0.39 -1.45 -1.02 -0.43 
3/27/20 136 1.52 0.16 1.42 0.34 -1.36 -1.08 -0.28 
3/28/20 174 1.40 0.33 1.35 0.33 -1.07 -1.02 -0.04 
3/29/20 38 1.32 -0.10 1.23 0.25 -1.41 -0.98 -0.44 
3/30/20 324 1.35 0.32 1.29 0.28 -1.03 -1.01 -0.02 
3/31/20 31 1.54 0.58 1.10 0.28 -0.96 -0.82 -0.14 
4/1/20 126 1.10 -0.13 0.93 0.31 -1.24 -0.62 -0.61 
4/2/20 274 1.13 0.17 0.89 0.30 -0.97 -0.58 -0.38 
4/3/20 290 0.83 0.08 0.78 0.32 -0.75 -0.46 -0.29 
4/4/20 66 0.54 -0.04 0.66 0.38 -0.59 -0.29 -0.30 
4/6/20 104 0.58 -0.17 0.54 0.40 -0.76 -0.14 -0.61 
4/7/20 44 0.61 -0.05 0.50 0.46 -0.66 -0.04 -0.62 
Table 1. ​Comparison of weekly changes in log daily confirmed cases of COVID-19 between 2,647 
counties with stay-at-home orders and 506 counties without orders on the same date.  Although mean 
rates of change decline for all counties, the rightmost column shows that all of the 2,647 counties with 
orders are in groups that decline faster than counties without orders. 
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One Week Change in  
Log Weekly Fatalities       
  
Counties With 
Stay-at-Home 
Order 
Counties Without 
Stay-at-Home 
Order    
Date 
Stay-at-Home 
Order Went 
Into Effect 
Number 
of 
Counties 
On 
Day of 
Order 
21 Days 
After 
Order 
On 
Day of 
Order 
21 Days 
After 
Order 
21-Day 
Difference  
in Change,  
With  
Order 
21-Day 
Difference  
in Change, 
Without 
Order 
Difference in 
Difference, 
Counties With 
Orders and Without 
Orders 
3/17/20 6 1.10 0.12 -0.69 0.94 -0.98 1.63 -2.62 
3/19/20 52 1.20 0.76 -0.69 0.43 -0.45 1.12 -1.57 
3/21/20 104 2.56 0.82 -0.69 0.71 -1.74 1.40 -3.14 
3/22/20 23 1.85 0.63 0.00 0.40 -1.21 0.40 -1.61 
3/23/20 209 1.81 0.33 0.00 0.34 -1.48 0.34 -1.82 
3/24/20 258 3.62 0.61 1.61 0.16 -3.01 -1.45 -1.56 
3/25/20 308 2.01 0.43 1.61 0.33 -1.59 -1.28 -0.31 
3/26/20 77 1.61 0.10 1.79 0.47 -1.51 -1.32 -0.19 
3/27/20 136 1.10 -0.14 2.48 0.16 -1.24 -2.32 1.08 
3/28/20 174 2.25 0.28 2.71 0.29 -1.98 -2.41 0.44 
3/29/20 38 1.50 0.12 2.08 0.26 -1.39 -1.82 0.43 
3/30/20 324 0.80 0.34 2.40 0.31 -0.46 -2.09 1.63 
3/31/20 31 1.28 0.01 1.61 0.49 -1.27 -1.12 -0.14 
4/1/20 126 1.72 0.05 1.89 0.32 -1.67 -1.57 -0.10 
4/2/20 274 1.66 0.44 1.92 0.16 -1.22 -1.76 0.54 
4/3/20 290 1.12 0.06 1.07 0.34 -1.06 -0.73 -0.33 
4/4/20 66 1.86 0.27 0.96 0.18 -1.59 -0.77 -0.81 
4/6/20 104 0.77 -0.13 0.92 0.23 -0.90 -0.69 -0.21 
4/7/20 44 0.65 0.40 0.94 0.02 -0.26 -0.92 0.67 
Table 2. ​Comparison of weekly changes in log daily fatalities due to COVID-19 between 2,647 counties 
with stay-at-home orders and 506 counties without orders on the same date.  Although mean rates of 
change decline for all counties, the rightmost column shows that 1,931 of the 2,647 counties with orders 
are in groups that decline faster than counties without orders. 
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Dependent Variable:  
One Week Change in  
Log Weekly Confirmed Cases 
Dependent 
Variable:  
One Week 
Change in Log 
Weekly 
Fatalities 
 Model 1 
7 Days After 
Model 2 
14 Days After 
Model 3 
21 Days After 
Model 4 
21 Days After 
  Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Difference Between Counties With and 
Without and Order, After the Order 
-0.36 0.12 -0.51 0.12 -0.67 0.15 -0.91 0.25 
Mean Difference Between Counties With and 
Without an Order 
0.38 0.09 0.38 0.12 0.34 0.14 0.64 0.26 
Mean Difference Before and After the Order -0.24 0.07 -0.27 0.15 0.19 0.13 -2.07 0.00 
One Week Change in Log Weekly Tests 
Performed 
0.21 0.15 0.45 0.17 0.85 0.12 -1.27 0.55 
Adjusted R​2 0.82   0.81   0.85   0.35   
Table 3. ​Difference-in-difference weighted least squares regression results. First row shows estimated 
treatment effect of stay-at-home orders on log weekly confirmed COVID-19 cases after 7 days (Model 1), 
14 days (Model 2), and 21 days, and effect on log weekly COVID-19 fatalities after 21 days (Model 4). 
Results for all models are for two observations each (one on the date of the order and one after the order) 
for 2,647 counties grouped by date of order (​N​ = 22), and paired with two observations each for 506 
counties on the same dates where no order was issued. All 88 county-group observations are weighted 
by the number of counties per group, fixed effects for county group and date are included in each model 
and standard errors are clustered by group. These models control for all fixed factors that vary between 
counties and factors that vary over time at the national level. 
 
spurious correlation between local factors (such as the date of onset of the disease or the capacity 
of the health system) and the timing of stay-at-home orders. To control for these factors, we 
apply a two-way fixed-effects difference-in-differences model to the data (see Methods). 
 
Table 3 shows results from three models for growth in weekly confirmed cases that estimate the 
effect of stay-at-home orders 7 days, 14 days, and 21 days after the orders go into effect. A 
fourth model shows an estimate of the effect of orders on growth in weekly fatalities after 21 
days.  The key estimates are in the top row of Table 3 and exponentiating these coefficients 
 allows us to interpret them as percentage changes in weekly cases.  They suggestexp(β) )( − 1  
that stay-at-home orders are associated with a 30.2 percent (11.0 to 45.2) reduction in weekly 
cases after one week, a 40.0 percent (23.4 to 53.0) reduction after two weeks, and a 48.6 percent 
(31.1 to 61.7) reduction after three weeks. Stay-at-home orders are also associated with a 59.8 
percent (18.3 to 80.2) reduction in weekly fatalities after three weeks.  
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Figure 4. ​Estimated effect of stay-at-home orders on one week change in log weekly confirmed 
COVID-19 cases​ (a)​ and COVID-19 fatalities ​(b)​, by the number of full days since the orders were issued. 
Estimates are derived from fixed-effects regression models that control for county-group level and date 
fixed effects and for correlated observations with cluster-robust standard errors at the county-group level 
(see Methods). Blue dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 4 shows these estimates along with the estimates for each day ​prior​ to and ​after​ the day a 
stay-at-home order goes into effect. The prior day estimates serve as a placebo test.  Unlike the 
raw data shown in Tables 2 and 3, the estimates here are adjusted for unobserved factors that 
could influence the course of the disease that vary over time and between counties. Notice that 
the estimates in Figure 4 before the order goes into effect exhibit high variance and the 
confidence intervals span zero. This suggests that county-group-level differences in case and 
fatality growth are not strongly influencing the timing of stay-at-home orders, helping to rule out 
the possibility that the later associations we see are driven by reverse-causality or differential 
trends.  
 
It is important to remember that one unit of a logarithm is an order of magnitude, and as such 
these results suggest stay-at-home orders had a large effect. We use the model estimates from 
Table 3 to produce a counterfactual number of unlogged cases and deaths for each county group 
under the assumption that growth in the absence of a stay-at-home order would have been higher 
by the estimated amount (see Methods). We employ the upper and lower confidence intervals of 
these estimates to calculate upper and lower bounds. These results suggest that stay-at-home 
orders reduced confirmed cases by 390,000 (170,000 to 680,000) and fatalities by 41,000 
(27,000 to 59,000) within the first three weeks in localities where they were implemented. 
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Discussion 
 
The results here suggest that stay-at-home orders in the United States are effective in limiting the 
spread of COVID-19 and provide some hope that the physical distancing measures now widely 
implemented are working to “flatten the curve.” The results also suggest that stay-at-home orders 
dramatically reduced both the number of cases and fatalities that result from the disease.  
 
With that said, we note certain limitations in our analysis. Stay-at-home policies are ultimately 
assigned endogenously so, as with any observational study, we cannot say for certain that the 
associations we have measured are the result of a causal effect. Our tests of reverse causality 
suggest that stay-at-home orders influence case growth and not the other way around, but there is 
no way around the fact that these are observational data from which causal estimates are 
notoriously difficult to obtain. 
 
Our dependent variables -- cases and fatalities -- are based on incomplete data. It is well-known 
that rates of testing in the United States were extremely low in the early part of the pandemic,​2​,​21 
so measures of cumulative cases and fatalities over time probably increased faster than the 
disease itself due to the addition of previously undetected infections. And many cases and 
fatalities may have gone undetected entirely. We attempt to control for this issue with county and 
time fixed effects and a measure of the growth in testing, but we are unlikely to have entirely 
adjusted for local variation in access to tests.  
 
Our independent variable, stay-at-home order status, measures a policy intervention that was 
often implemented simultaneously or within days of several other local interventions, such as 
bans on mass gatherings and closures of schools, non-essential businesses, and/or public areas. 
Given the uncertainty about how many days infected individuals are contagious both before and 
after the onset of symptoms, efforts to generate a sharp estimate of the effects of policies that 
were implemented within days of each other are difficult. Moreover, our analysis suggests these 
other local interventions might also have an effect on cases and fatalities. On average, the peak 
of infections happens three days ​prior​ to the stay-at-home order. In addition, we see significant 
reductions in the growth rate of cases and fatalities within days of the order. This is in spite of 
the fact that case identification during the early part of our observations was based on tests that 
often took a week to be resolved.​2​,​21 
 
With our current empirical approach we cannot perfectly separate the effects of other local 
interventions from that of stay-at-home orders. This means that our estimates should properly be 
interpreted as the effect of stay-at-home orders bundled with effects of correlated local 
interventions. Our controls are the set of counties that did not issue mandatory orders, but in 
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those localities residents may have voluntarily changed their social behaviors. As such, our 
estimates are the difference between the effects of an average bundle of changes in counties that 
issued orders relative to an average bundle of changes in counties that did not. An interesting 
question which we leave for future work is which local interventions in the policy mix helped the 
most. 
 
One final limitation is that we assume the effects of stay-at-home orders between localities are 
independent, but it is likely that significant spillovers exist.  Consider the effect of the epidemic 
in New York City on neighboring counties in New Jersey, Connecticut, and as far away as 
Rhode Island.  Or the effect of Mardi Gras in Louisiana or Spring Break in Florida on a variety 
of locales throughout the United States.  This suggests significant spillover of infections. To the 
extent stay-at-home orders likewise spill over to other localities -- as seems reasonable to assume 
-- we have likely ​underestimated​ the effect of stay-at-home orders because control counties are 
partially treated by connections to counties with orders. 
 
It is important to note that COVID-19 cases and fatalities continue to grow in many areas in the 
United States. Only when the rate of growth turns negative will we know whether or not we 
slowed the disease in time to keep it from overrunning the health system capacity in various 
localities. There is much still to be done, and we are hopeful that the work here will help our 
fellow scientists, policymakers, and the public-at-large to plan for the next steps in managing this 
disease. 
 
Methods 
 
Data 
 
The time and date of county-level “stay-at-home” or “shelter-in-place” orders for each state and 
locality were aggregated and reported on a web page maintained by the ​New York Times​ starting 
on March 24, 2020.​23​ As new orders went into effect, this page was updated. We checked it once 
daily to update the data through May 7, 2020.  In some cases a statewide order was reported with 
reference to earlier city-level or county-level orders in the state without specifying where they 
occurred. In those cases, we searched local news outlets to find references to official city and 
county orders in the state that preceded the statewide order. For each county in each state we 
recorded the earliest time and date that a city, county, or statewide order came into effect.  
 
County-level data on cumulative COVID-19 confirmed cases were also aggregated daily by the 
New York Times​.​24​ We discarded all observations where cases were not assigned to a specific 
county (these account for 0.8% of total cases).  We retained observations where cumulative cases 
declined from one day to the next due to official revisions to the counts (0.8% of cases). 
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Availability of tests for COVID-19 in the United States has not been uniform over the date range 
of the study.​21​ To mitigate the effect of changes in rates of testing on our measure of both 
confirmed cases and fatalities, we also collected data on the number of tests administered each 
day. This information is not currently available for each county, but it is available for each state 
by date from the COVID Tracking Project​25​.  When we aggregated observations into county 
groups we measured the weighted mean of these state-level tests, where the weights are the 
number of counties from a county group in each state. 
 
Estimation 
 
In our data, we observe cases and fatalities ​y​ for each county ​k ​and date ​t.​ We would like to 
compare counties with orders to those without, so we aggregate cases and fatalities by county 
groups ​c​ that each include all counties that implement the same stay-at-home policy. This 
includes 22 groups of counties that each chose to issue a stay-at-home order on a unique date and 
one group that never issued a stay at home order. Since both cases and fatalities grow 
exponentially in our data, we measure the rate of change as the difference in log weekly counts 
and we add 1 to ensure the log is defined:  
.      (1)n( )Δyct = l ∑
 
k∈c, t∈{−6,0}
yct + 1 −
 
n( )l ∑
 
k∈c, t∈{−13,−7}
yct + 1
 
 
 
For each of the 22 county groups where an order was enacted ( ), we include in the dataxc = 1  
observations from two periods, one on the date of the stay-at-home order ( ) and one on apct = 0  
date ​d​ days in the future ( ). For comparison, we also include two observations from thepct+d = 1  
group that had no order ( ) on the same dates ​t​ and ​t​ + ​d​. This yields a total of 88xc = 0  
observations for each scalar value ​d​ that we consider.  
 
We model the effect of stay-at-home orders with a two-way fixed-effects weighted least squares 
regression model:​26 
 
 .       (2)x p x p u  Δyct = αc + τt + β1 c + β2 ct + β3 ct ct +  ct  
 
A strength of this model is that fixed effects control for all time-invariant features of eachαc  
county group that might drive rates of change in cases and fatalities.​27​ For example, each county 
has its own age profile, socioeconomic status, local health care system, base rate of population 
health, and date on which a first case of COVID-19 was observed.  Additionally, time fixed 
effects control for factors that vary over time.​27​ For example, case rates could be affected byτt  
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changes in the availability of testing nationally, in social behaviors influenced by daily events 
reported in the media, and national-level policies that vary from one day to the next. 
 
Including  allows us to control for the overall difference between counties that ever had anxβ1 c  
order and those that did not. Similarly,  allows us to control for the overall differencepβ2 ct  
between period 1 and period 0. Including the interaction of these two variables  allows uspxct ct  
to estimate , the difference in the differences between counties that had an order and thoseβ3  
that did not. This estimate captures the causal effect of stay-at-home orders on cases and 
fatalities under one assumption. The assumption is that counties that implement orders on a 
specific date would have had similar changes in cases as counties that did implement orders if 
the implementing counties had not issued the order. This is the standard parallel trends 
assumption of difference-in-difference models. 
 
Finally, we also weight each county group observation by the number of counties and we cluster 
standard errors ​u​ct​ at the county group level.  This adjusts the estimated standard errors for 
unobservable factors correlated within county groups and allows interpretation of the marginal 
effects at the county level. 
 
We can examine the temporal dynamics of stay-at-home orders by repeating the regression 
model for different values of ​d​ days between the date of the order and the later post-treatment 
period. We can also let ​d ​be negative to see if there are systematic differences in cases and 
fatalities between counties with and without orders prior to the date orders go into effect.  This 
allows us to test whether differences in cases and fatalities might cause changes in the date an 
order is enacted, rather than the other way around. Due to data availability constraints, the full 
range of possible days that we can model is  Estimates for these models for both− 4, 6}.d∈ { 1 2  
cases and fatalities are shown in Figure 3. 
 
We can also use the regression results to estimate a counterfactual number of cases and fatalities 
possibly prevented by stay-at-home orders.  Since is the estimated difference in change in logβ3  
weekly counts, the counterfactual difference in unlogged counts is simply  timesexp(β ) ][ 3 − 1  
the observed weekly count. We calculate this separately for each county group for week 1 using 
the model where  ​and we repeat for week 2 (model ) and week 3 (model ),d = 7 4d = 1 1d = 2  
summing over all 22 county groups and all 3 weeks. 
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